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ABSTRACT: Fingerprint examiners traditionally express conclusions in categorical terms, opining that impressions do or do not originate
from the same source. Recently, probabilistic conclusions have been proposed, with examiners estimating the probability of a match between
recovered and known prints. This study presented a nationally representative sample of jury-eligible adults with a hypothetical robbery case in
which an examiner opined on the likelihood that a defendant’s fingerprints matched latent fingerprints in categorical or probabilistic terms. We
studied model language developed by the U.S. Defense Forensic Science Center to summarize results of statistical analysis of the similarity
between prints. Participant ratings of the likelihood the defendant left prints at the crime scene and committed the crime were similar when
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For over a hundred years, latent fingerprint examiners have con-
ducted detailed visual examinations of evidence and reached con-
clusions about the probative value of that evidence for a criminal
investigation. Traditionally, examiners summarize their conclu-
sions using categorical language: Latent fingerprints collected from
a crime scene either were or were not suitable for comparison, and,
for those latent prints deemed suitable for comparison, the latent
prints and inked fingerprints obtained from a suspect either did or
did not originate from the same source (1). When fingerprint exam-
iners present their conclusions at trial using categorical language,
jurors receive a clear message: The suspect’s fingerprints either do
or do not match the fingerprints collected from the crime scene.
This clear message is potentially misleading, however, because
jurors may assign greater certainty to the match/no-match opinion
than is warranted. While some forensic techniques, most notably
DNA analysis, generate statistics-based estimates of a “random
match probability” that will be presented to fact finders in proba-
bilistic terms, other techniques, such as fingerprint examinations,
rely on subjective assessments of a match that do not lend them-
selves to specific probabilities. Examination of the forensic analyst
at trial may reveal the subjective and imprecise nature of a match
opinion, but courts have long allowed opinions presented in cate-
gorical terms. Accordingly, the fact finder’s understanding of the
probability of a match may differ from the subjective probability
assigned by the forensic analyst.
Concerns about the accuracy of subjective matching method-
ologies (e.g., [2–4]) have led forensic science laboratories and
professional associations to consider alterations to their method-
ologies (5). One innovation in this respect is the adoption of sta-
tistical software that measures the similarity between markers
identified in crime scene specimens and known specimens, to
calculate the probability that the specimens come from the same
versus different sources. Such software has been developed by
the U.S. Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC) for fingerprint
examinations. This program, FRStat, generates an estimate of
the likelihood that comparison prints would share observed simi-
larities if those specimens come from the same versus different
sources (6); additional information about this program is avail-
able at https://osf.io/pmkwf/. DFSC also promulgated model lan-
guage to communicate the results of this statistical analysis to
fact finders:
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
The latent print on Exhibit 1 and the standards bearing the
name DOE have corresponding ridge detail. The probability
of observing this amount of correspondence is approxi-
mately [XXX] times greater when impressions are made by
the same source rather than by different sources.
Defense Forensic Science Center fingerprint examiners now
use this language to present the results of their fingerprint com-
parisons (6).
Innovations such as FRStat and the DFSC’s model language
for presenting the results of this program raise concerns that jur-
ors may misuse or misunderstand statistical evidence (e.g.,
[7,8]). “Current research on jury interpretation of probabilistic
evidence is sparse, but the research that has been done has
tended to indicate that jurors are not particularly good at
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assigning it appropriate weight within the context of a case”
([5], p. 80).
Much of the research into jury comprehension of statistical
evidence has involved DNA evidence, which presents both
methodological and numerical complexities. Studies have shown
that jurors are sensitive to the probabilities associated with DNA
evidence, but they sometimes misunderstand random match
probabilities (9–11). Small changes in how DNA statistics are
presented (e.g., using percentages versus frequencies to commu-
nicate random match probabilities) can alter the weight given to
the evidence (12). But clear explanations of the proper interpre-
tation of DNA evidence can improve juror comprehension (13).
This study sought to examine how jury-eligible adults compre-
hend probabilistic fingerprint evidence, in particular fingerprint
evidence presented using the DFSC’s new model language rela-
tive to fingerprint evidence presented in traditional categorical
(match/no-match) terms. By comparing the weight given to prob-
abilistic versus categorical match evidence, we can obtain a bet-
ter understanding of the match probabilities that jurors assign to
categorical fingerprint evidence and examine whether jurors
share common interpretations of different levels of probabilistic
evidence (e.g., does fingerprint evidence presented as one mil-
lion times more likely to be from the same than different persons
have a greater impact on jurors than fingerprint evidence pre-
sented as only ten times more likely to come from the same per-
son?).
In prior research, we found that the particular categorical lan-
guage used by fingerprint examiners mattered little: Categorical
match opinions carried considerable weight regardless of
whether the examiner stated that opinion starkly, bolstered it
with unwarranted statements of certainty, or qualified it by
admitting that someone other than the defendant might be the
source of the latent prints (1). This prior research did not exam-
ine, however, whether the subjective probabilities of a match, as
determined by an examiner, corresponded to the jurors’ assigned
probabilities. Although the present research does not gather data
on fingerprint examiners’ subjective probabilities, it does provide
insight into the weight that jurors assign to a fingerprint identifi-
cation described in categorical terms.
Method
Participants
We commissioned Qualtrics to recruit a nationally representa-
tive sample of adult participants with respect to gender, race/eth-
nicity, age, income, and geographic region in the United States.
The 1050 adults who participated in the study each received
approximately $3 for their participation, which took less than
10 min. We report the results based on responses of 858 partici-
pants who passed three quality control checks while completing
the survey (14): (i) After giving informed consent, these partici-
pants committed to reading the questions and giving their best
answers; (ii) these participants responded correctly to a question
approximately midway through the survey directing them to
enter a particular answer to ensure that they were attending to
the questions; (iii) these participants responded correctly to a
question near the end of the survey asking them to give the sum
of one plus three. Inclusion of the full sample in the analyses
reported below does not alter the results in any substantial way,
but we focus on this subsample because we have greater confi-
dence that they carefully considered the questions that we posed
to them. The full data set and the experimental materials used in
the study are publicly available at https://osf.io/pmkwf/.
The high-attention subsample consisted of 419 (49%) males
and 439 (51%) females, with a mean age of 46.54 (SD = 16.82),
a median age of 46, and an age range of 18–90. Seventy-five
percent of the sample had at least some post-high-school educa-
tion, 23.8% had a 4-year college degree, and 11.8% had a pro-
fessional or doctorate degree. Sixty-eight percent of the
subsample identified as White, 12% as Black, 4% as Asian,
13.4% as Hispanic, 0.5% as American Indian/Alaska Native, and
1.3% as other. Thirty percent self-identified as Republican,
39.5% as Democrat, and the remainder stated that they had no
consistent political preference. Twenty-two percent of partici-
pants resided in the northeastern region of the United States,
while 23% resided in the west, 17.4% in the midwest, and
37.5% in the south. The median household annual income fell in
the range of $40,000–$49,999. Approximately one-third of the
subsample reported previously serving on a jury, and 31.7% sta-
ted that they or a family member had been arrested by the
police.
Procedure and Materials
The experimental materials were created and provided to the
participants using Qualtrics’ online survey platform. After partic-
ipants completed initial demographic questions, they were pre-
sented with a vignette describing a robbery that occurred at a
convenience store. In brief, an assailant wearing a mask robbed
a convenience store with a gun, but the assailant dropped the
gun when exiting the store. An individual was arrested shortly
after the crime, but no proceeds of the crime were found on the
person and the store clerk could not positively identify the
arrestee as the robber because the robber had worn a mask.
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of nine
different versions of the hypothetical case. Participants assigned
to the control condition received no further information about
the case (i.e., these participants received no information about
fingerprint evidence). Participants assigned to one of the eight
fingerprint evidence conditions were told that a fingerprint exam-
iner compared fingerprints recovered from the handle of the gun
dropped at the crime scene to the defendant’s fingerprints and
determined that the prints matched.
In two of the fingerprint evidence conditions, the fingerprint
examiner used categorical language to describe the fingerprint
match: In the “simple match” condition, the examiner concluded
that “the fingerprint was individualized as the right thumb of the
defendant”; in the “strong match” condition, the examiner added
to the simple match language that it was a “practical impossibil-
ity that the prints came from a different source.” The remaining
six scenarios presented the fingerprint examiner’s testimony in
probabilistic terms based on the DFSC’s model language:
The probability of observing this amount of correspondence
is approximately [1,000,000; 100,000; 10,000; 1,000, 100;
10] times greater when impressions are made by the same
source rather than by different sources. This conclusion
was reached using software that measures the degree of
similarity between fingerprint impressions.
It is worth noting that how the FRstat software is described to
jurors may affect juror acceptance of the results of that software;
however, we did not in this study test the impact of alternative
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ways of presenting the software. Future research should examine
this possibility.
After reading about the case, participants responded to our
main dependent variables by (i) stating whether they would con-
vict the defendant (yes or no); (ii) estimating the likelihood that
the defendant left his prints on the gun on a scale ranging from
0 (certainly did not leave his prints on the gun) to 100 (certainly
did leave his prints on the gun), with 50 corresponding to com-
plete uncertainty; and (iii) estimating the likelihood that the
defendant committed the robbery using the same scale. Partici-
pants were given the following information on how to use the
0–100 scales: “Numbers below 50 indicate that you think it is
more likely that the defendant did not commit the robbery (the
smaller the number, the less likely). Numbers above 50 indicate
that you think it is more likely the defendant did commit the
robbery (the bigger the number, the more likely). 0 represents
certainty that the defendant did not commit the robbery. One
hundred represents certainty that the defendant did commit the
robbery. Fifty indicates uncertainty as to whether the defendant
did or did not commit the robbery” (participants were given sim-
ilar guidance on how to use the scale to indicate the likelihood
the defendant left prints on the gun). After completing these
main dependent measures, participants completed a few general
questions about forensic evidence and their aversions to false
convictions and false acquittals.
Results
Across all conditions, 50% percent of participants indicated
that they would vote to convict the defendant. In the control
condition, where no fingerprint evidence was presented, only
22.5% of participants indicated that they would vote for convic-
tion, whereas 53.7% would vote for conviction when fingerprint
evidence was presented. Thus, when fingerprint evidence of any
kind was presented, participants were significantly more likely to
vote in favor of conviction, v2(1) = 34.89, p < 0.001. A logistic
regression comparing the odds of conviction in each fingerprint
condition to the odds of conviction in the control condition
reported significant results for each comparison, with all Exp
(b)’s > 11.00 and all p’s < 0.01.
We next compared conviction rates in the simple match condi-
tion to conviction rates in the strongest and weakest probabilistic
match conditions (i.e., the conditions in which the examiner
opined that it was 1 million versus 10 times more likely that the
latent print came from the defendant than someone else), but we
found no significant differences in conviction rates. In other
words, when participants had to make the dichotomous choice
of convict or not, participants were just as likely to convict when
the fingerprint evidence was presented in categorical terms as
probabilistic terms, regardless of the specific language used to
describe the match or probability of a match (Fig. 1 presents the
conviction rates for each condition).
We also examined whether the different ways of presenting
the fingerprint evidence affected responses on the two more sen-
sitive-dependent variables, which were scored on 0–100 scales:
(i) the likelihood the defendant left prints on the gun and (ii) the
likelihood the defendant committed the crime. On both of these
variables, there were significant differences in ratings across the
fingerprint evidence conditions (F(7,748) = 2.529, p = 0.014
and F(7,748) = 3.159, p = 0.003, respectively). These findings
held when the data were standardized (z-scored) as well. We
then compared ratings on these two dependent variables within
the simple match condition to the ratings in the strongest and
weakest probabilistic match conditions (Fig. 2 presents mean rat-
ings on the likelihood left prints and likelihood committed the
crime questions across the experimental conditions). Ratings on
these two continuous variables did not differ significantly
between the simple match and strongest probabilistic match con-
dition, but the ratings on both variables differed significantly
between the simple match and weakest probabilistic match con-
dition (both F’s > 10.00 and both p’s = 0.001). Finally, we
compared ratings on these two variables between the strongest
and weakest probabilistic match conditions: The difference on
the likelihood of committing the crime variable was statistically
significant (F(1,193) = 4.56, p = 0.034), but the difference on
the likelihood of leaving prints on the gun was not
(F(1,193) = 2.84, p = 0.094). When we compared the second
strongest probabilistic evidence (100,000 times more likely that
defendant rather than another was the source) to the weakest
probabilistic evidence (only 10 times more likely defendant was
the source), we observed no significant difference in ratings on
either of the continuous dependent variables.
We next examined the contribution of individual difference
variables on participants’ ratings of the likelihood the defendant
left his prints on the gun dropped at the crime scene. We entered
into the regression the following possible explanatory variables:
experimental condition (i.e., an indicator variable for the finger-
print evidence condition to which the participant was assigned),
participant sex, age, race/ethnicity, political preference, regional
location, prior jury service (yes/no), prior arrest of self or family
member (yes/no), numeracy as measured by an objective test of
persons’ mathematical knowledge, and error aversion (whether
the person viewed a false conviction or false acquittal as more
serious or saw the errors as equally bad). The model that most
efficiently explained variance in ratings on the “left prints” vari-
able contained only numeracy, error aversion, and age
(R2 = 0.06, p < 0.001) (adding the political preference variable
to numeracy, error aversion, and age significantly improved pre-
diction but only slightly increased the variance explained
[change in R2 = 0.005, p < 0.05]). Regardless of experimental
condition, participants higher in numeracy tended to give higher
ratings to the likelihood the defendant’s prints were left on the
gun (rpartial = 0.202). Participants who believed false convictions
are worse than false acquittals tended to give lower ratings (rpar-
tial = 0.129). Older participants tended to give higher ratings
(rpartial = 0.120). Persons rating false convictions and false
acquittals as equally bad on average rated the likelihood that the
defendant left his prints on the gun highest (M = 65.96), fol-
lowed by those rating false acquittals as worse (M = 62.66) and
those rating false convictions worse (M = 59.85). Only the dif-
ference in ratings between the “equally bad” and “false convic-
tions worse” group was statistically significant (t(711) = 2.813,
p = 0.005).
The results for the error aversion variable, which to date has
not received much attention as an influence on evidentiary
assessments, are particularly interesting for two reasons. First,
the majority of respondents indicated that they considered false
convictions and false acquittals equally bad (n = 431; 50.2%),
while approximately one-third of respondents rated false convic-
tions as worse than false acquittals (n = 282; 32.9%) and a
smaller but still sizeable percentage rated false acquittals as
worse (n = 145; 16.9%). Recall that we collected a nationally
representative sample, which suggests that many Americans do
not share the common assumption within the law that false con-
victions are more serious than false acquittals. Second, we
observed sex differences on this variable: About equal
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percentages of women and men rated false acquittals as worse
(15.9% vs. 17.9%), but fewer women than men rated false con-
victions as worse (32.9% vs. 37.9%), and more women than
men rated the two errors as equally bad (50.2% vs. 44.2%).
Finally, we collected data on general views about the reliabil-
ity of fingerprint and DNA evidence and their value as unique
identifiers of individuals. The modal response for both finger-
print and DNA evidence in terms of reliability was “very
FIG. 1––Conviction rates across experimental condition. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIG. 2––Mean ratings of likelihood defendant left prints and committed the crime across experimental conditions. Note: error bars = 95% confidence interval.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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reliable”: 70.9% rated fingerprint evidence as very reliable or
reliable, whereas 87.1% rated DNA evidence as very reliable or
reliable; 23.9% rated fingerprint evidence as somewhat reliable
compared to 9.7% for DNA evidence; fewer than 5% rated fin-
gerprint evidence somewhat unreliable or unreliable compared to
fewer than 3% for DNA evidence. Generally, both fingerprint
and DNA evidence were seen as reliable forms of identification
evidence, with DNA faring somewhat better. In terms of their
value as unique identifiers of individuals, both types of evidence
were seen as unique identifiers of particular individuals. We
asked participants to estimate how many other people of the
approximately 7 billion people in the world have fingerprints
and DNA identical to their own: The modal response on both
questions was zero, which was the response given by 76% of
the sample on the fingerprint question and 77% on the DNA
question. A few respondents estimated that a handful of other
people shared their fingerprints or DNA, but 90% of the sample
believed that 12 or fewer other people shared their fingerprints
or DNA. These results suggest that most Americans assume that
their fingerprints and DNA are unique to themselves (i.e., do not
match the fingerprints or DNA of anyone else).
Discussion
Our results suggest that the traditional categorical approach to
fingerprint evidence, in which the fingerprint examiner declares
a match between latent and inked prints, carries great weight
with laypersons, but our results also show that a strong proba-
bilistic statement about the likelihood of a match carries similar
weight. Potential jurors, on reading about weaker probabilistic
fingerprint evidence, adjusted downward their estimates of the
likelihood a defendant left prints at the crime scene, as they
should have. However, we also found that jurors did not mean-
ingfully distinguish between a wide range of probabilities that
objectively differed greatly. While the probability of 1,000,000
times greater produced significantly higher estimates that the
defendant left his prints on the gun and committed the crime,
the lower probabilities ranging from 100,000 to just ten times
more probable did not produce significant differences in these
estimates (we did, however, observe a downward trend in these
estimates with the lowest probability evidence, as shown in
Fig. 2). This finding suggests the need for further research on
how to better promote juror discrimination among degrees of
probability, including quite disparate degrees of probability. Our
findings suggest that it may be a challenge to do so by relying
simply on conclusion language, given our finding that even the
objectively weaker probabilistic fingerprint evidence was suffi-
cient to move many jurors from a vote of acquittal to a vote of
conviction. One reason why even relatively weak fingerprint evi-
dence is likely to be convincing is that our survey showed that
most jurors enter trials with the prior belief that fingerprint evi-
dence is reliable and that fingerprints are unique to particular
individuals.
We did not observe the confusion that studies have found
when studying perceptions of DNA evidence. However, the
model language utilized by the DFSC keeps a discussion of the
technical details to a minimum and presents the probabilities
derived from the FRStat software in straightforward terms. A
searching cross-examination that raises questions about the valid-
ity of the estimates generated and about the meaning of the
probabilistic language might introduce confusion or concerns
that would reduce the understanding and weight of DFSC finger-
print examiners. Future studies should examine this possibility.
Furthermore, we intentionally kept the evidence offered in our
hypothetical criminal case minimal, to focus participants on the
fingerprint evidence testimony. Future studies should examine
how jurors react to different formulations of fingerprint examiner
testimony when there is a greater mix of pro-prosecution and
pro-defense evidence. It is likely that juror interpretations of rel-
atively weaker probabilistic match evidence will depend on the
strength of the corroborating evidence.
Finally, our study suggests an important line of inquiry into
the role that jurors’ error aversions play in their assessments of
evidence. Jurors predisposed to concerns about false acquittals
may have lower thresholds for acceptance of fingerprint evidence
or prosecution evidence more generally. We did not instruct our
mock jurors on the presumption of innocence or reasonable
doubt; whether such instructions can overcome the concerns
many jurors have about false acquittals poses an important ques-
tion for further study (15).
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that jury-eligible adults can make dis-
tinctions among fingerprint evidence presented in probabilistic
terms and will place as much weight on high-probability match
evidence as categorical match evidence. The results provide
some support for the move toward assigning probabilities to
forensic identifications and for a move away from categorical
conclusions that may mask the degree of uncertainty attached to
an identification opinion. However, jurors did not discriminate
among any but the highest and lowest probability evidence, and
failed to distinguish between match probabilities ranging from
ten to one hundred thousand. Thus, these results also suggest
that more research is needed on how to present statistical evi-
dence in a way that will cause jurors to distinguish more care-
fully between degrees of probability.
References
1. Garrett B, Mitchell G. How jurors evaluate fingerprint evidence: the rela-
tive importance of match language, method information and error
acknowledgement. J Empir Leg Stud 2013;10(3):484–511.
2. National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Science Community. Strengthening forensic science in the Uni-
ted States: a path forward. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, 2009;136–45.
3. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST).
Scientific criteria for validity and reliability of forensic feature-compari-
son methods. In: Report to the President: forensic science in criminal
courts: ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison methods. North
Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Publishing, 2016;44–65.
4. American Association for the Advancement of Sciences (AAAS). Foren-
sic science assessments: a quality and gap analysis, latent fingerprint
examination, 2017;8–12; https://www.aaas.org/page/forensic-science-asse
ssments-quality-and-gap-analysis (accessed March 26, 2018).
5. Eldridge H. The shifting landscape of latent print testimony: an Ameri-
can perspective. J Forensic Sci Med 2017;3(2):72–81.
6. Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC). Information paper: modifica-
tion of latent print technical reports to include statistical calculations,
2017; https://osf.io/pmkwf/(accessed March 26, 2018).
7. Goodman J. Jurors’ comprehension and assessment of probabilistic evi-
dence. Am J Trial Advoc 1992;16:361–90.
8. Tribe LH. Trial by mathematics: precision and ritual in the legal process.
Harvard Law Rev 1971;84(6):1329–93.
9. Koehler JJ, Chia A, Lindsey S. The random match probability (RMP) in
DNA evidence: irrelevant and prejudicial? Jurimetrics 1995;35(2):201–
19.
10. Thompson WC, Kaasa SO, Peterson T. Do jurors give appropriate
weight to forensic identification evidence? J Empir Legal Stud 2013;10
(2):359–97.
5
11. Thompson WC, Schumann EL. Interpretation of statistical evidence in
criminal trials: the prosecutor’s fallacy and the defense attorney’s fallacy.
Law Hum Behav 1987;11(3):167–87.
12. Koehler J, Macchi L. Thinking about low-probability events. An exem-
plar-cuing theory. Psychol Sci 2004;15(8):540–6.
13. Kaye DH, Hans VP, Dann BM, Farley E, Albertson S. Statistics in the
jury box: how jurors respond to mitochondrial DNA match probabilities.
J Empir Legal Stud 2007;4(4):797–834.
14. Oppenheimer DM, Meyvis T, Davidenko N. Instructional manipulation
checks: detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. J Exp Soc Psy-
chol 2009;45(4):867–72.
15. Scurich N, John RS. Jurors’ presumption of innocence. J Legal Stud
2017;46(1):187–206.
Additional information and reprint requests:
Brandon Garrett, J.D.
School of Law
University of Virginia
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville
VA 22903
E-mail: bgarrett@virginia.edu
6
